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 Confronted with the reality of the mosaic contemporary culture, philosophy 
is no longer able to preserve its classical image and functions. It becomes engaged 
in a dialogue between science and other forms of culture, between different non-
similar cultural worlds present in the communication space of the global 
community. The critical mission of philosophy emerged as one of its major 
functions together with the collapse of the classical metaphysics and the rise of 
postmetaphysical thinking. J. Habermas rightly emphasized that postmetaphysical 
thinking considerably differs from the classical metaphysics of Antiquity and the 
Middle Ages, as well as from the Modernity metaphysics of consciousness offering 
a new perspective of philosophizing on the communicative basis. Given this new 
status of philosophy, it becomes involved as a mediator in the cultural milieu 
criticizing its various outcomes and unifying them in common space (Habermas 
1994: 50). With this apparently new role, philosophy should also help in the 
dialogue between non-similar cultural worlds thus making possible constant 
negotiations between them. However, assuming the importance of its critical role, 
philosophy is still preserving its function as a universal tribunal of reason inherited 
from the European Enlightenment. This means that the reality of cultural pluralism 
revealed by the philosophical reason in its critical faculty should be reconciled 
with its universalist potential acknowledged even by the radical postmodernist 
thought. To remain true to its vocation, contemporary philosophy should preserve 
in a modified fashion both capacities of producing a universalist and critical 
theoretical worldviews. 
 
 Absolute Tribunal of Philosophical Reason and the Plurality of Cultures 
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 The classical metaphysics of the Antiquity and the Middle Ages was based 
on the assumption that philosophical reason allied with the intellect is able to rise 
above the empirically given reality and uncover the ontological foundations of the 
universe. The strong understanding of theoretical thinking able to expose the 
essential structure of reality led to metaphysical constructions revealing the 
hierarchy of being and man’s place in the universe. Irrespective of the considerable 
differences between the classical philosophy of the Antiquity and the mediaeval 
religious metaphysics, they were both not at all sensitive to the reality of culture 
produced by human beings. In the philosophical thought of this time, human 
culture was not opposed to the order of nature and was conceived as its 
continuation.  
 With the coming of Modernity, philosophical reason aspires to find its own 
foundations within itself producing the metaphysics of consciousness. The 
sovereignty of thought becomes the basic assumption of the new constellation of 
philosophers from R. Descartes to I. Kant and G. W. Fr. Hegel. “Whether reason is 
now approached in foundationalist terms as a subjectivity that makes possible the 
world as a whole, or whether it is conceived dialectically as a spirit that recovers 
itself in the procession through nature and history, in either case reason is active as 
a simultaneously totalizing and self-referential reflection (Habermas 1994: 32).” In 
the understanding of the inner machinery of human consciousness, they find the 
key to the universe.  Thus, continuing the line of classical metaphysics, philosophy 
undergoes a radical change: it comes to the reflexive interpretation of its own 
mission as a self-justifying thought activity. Any coherent worldview should be 
worked out since that time as a result of reflexive comprehension of the inner 
ability of mind. When viewed in this perspective, philosophical understanding of 
the life of the mind should provide the secure path for working out human 
theoretical and practical strategies in the world. The belief in the ability of 
philosophical reason to become the final point of justification of human rational 
activity was at once universalist and critical in its character. It contains the 
presupposition that philosophical theory has a strong potential permitting to cope 
with this tremendously difficult task. 
 The approach to philosophy as a final tribunal of reason is most clearly 
formulated in Kant’s famous essay Conflict of the Faculties where he comes to the 
conclusion that no other discipline is able to give a justification for all kind of 
human theoretical and practical activity (Kant 1966a: 331). Philosophy, in his 
opinion, represents the unique capacity of self-founding thinking giving on the 
basis of transcendental methodology a key to the universal a priori foundations and 
limits of the functioning of theoretical and practical reason, as well as the faculty 
of judgement. Analysing the potential of philosophical reason in its relations with 
the intellect, Kant comes to the conclusion that reason is able to rise beyond the 
empirically given and produce ideas representing the human world as a meaningful 
whole. Thus, he touches upon the problem that should become later the focal point 
of the reflexive understanding of the hermeneutical dimension of reason. In the 
self-founding capacity, philosophy unifies both critical and universalist aspirations 
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opening the horizon of world interpretation in a cosmopolitan sense. Philosophical 
reason goes beyond the boundaries of any human group or nation and produces a 
vision of the world that motivates any rational subject to accept a critically 
grounded universalist worldview. 
 This interpretation of philosophy as a self-founding theoretical activity was 
further developed in the Hegelian thought. Philosophy as a reflexive thinking, 
Hegel believes, is equipped with the absolute power of reason surpassing any 
limits of the finalized products of the intellect (Hegel 1970: 78). Possessing this 
capacity, philosophical reason is endowed with the gift to dialectically grasp in its 
constant reflexive self-development the Absolute that is also given in its immediate 
presence to faith. On the basis of categorical synthesis, philosophy, in the Hegelian 
view, should reveal the absolute logical foundations of the universe. If philosophy 
is a never-ending reflexive activity of reason, it should trace the inner dialectical 
self-deployment of the Absolute in history (Bubner 2003: 130). This should give a 
philosophical reason, Hegel believed, a historical dimension. When compared with 
the Kantian vision of philosophical reason’s ability, it is a radically new chance to 
understand the universalism of philosophy as relevant to a certain cultural 
situation. However, this potential chance is not realized in Hegel’s system due to 
its monologue character and inability to accept the otherness and multiplicity of 
logical strategies. 
 The opposition of culture and nature emerged as a specific fruit of 
Modernity making the universe of human cultural creativity a specific field of 
philosophical reflexion. Since the time of its appearance in the 18-th century, 
philosophy of culture paid tribute to human ability to rise above the limits of nature 
and to produce a meaningful world that differs from the reproducible cosmic order. 
At the same time, the classical Modernity looked at cultural reality as crowning the 
inner rational structure of the universe and leading to its final perfection. It was 
understood as a continuation of the realm of nature with its universal rational 
order. Uncovering the world’s rational foundations, philosophical reason should 
find a universal key to the riddle of mankind’s cultural development. It should do it 
relying on its own rational reflexive resources permitting him to grasp the inner 
logic of cultural reality in its historical transformation. If so, the uniqueness of 
different cultural worlds may be understood only on the basis of a certain general 
idea accessible for philosophical reason. Otherwise, philosophy in a cosmopolitan 
sense would be inconceivable. Philosophy built upon this premise is able to 
criticize culture only for its inadequateness to the ideal principles revealed by 
reason whose historical dimension and limits are not examined within its format.   
 The metaphysics of consciousness offers its vision of cultural progress in the 
teleological perspective. A true universalist philosophizing, Kant believed, should 
rest upon the analysis of the main faculties of consciousness autonomous activity 
providing a key to the understanding of human cultural creativity and progressive 
self-perfection of mankind within the realm of history.  Philosophy in a 
cosmopolitan sense should rise beyond the limits of any existing human 
community and culture revealing mankind’s common goal of development. In his 
4 
 
work The Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, Kant moves 
to the crucial point of his critical metaphysics claiming that human reason is able 
to coin the idea casting light on the immanent plan of nature that directs the destiny 
of mankind. In the light of this idea, the universal history looks like a field of a 
constant perfection of theoretical and practical reason leading to the final point of a 
cosmopolitan world order where the triumph of human freedom is achieved. 
Despite the exiting contradictions and conflicts, the world community governed by 
the inner teleology of nature gradually progresses to the stage where they should 
necessarily disappear and the international law should grant any particular human 
being a status of a world citizen on the basis of a universal civil society (Kant 
1966: 28). At this hypothetical point, reaching the understanding of mankind’s 
common destiny, philosophy acquires perfection in its cosmopolitan dimension. 
 The Hegelian thought also proves its final universal validity through the self-
development of the Absolute within the human reality. Hegel spoke of culture as 
the outcome of “universal labour” of human subjects involved in the teleology of 
history ordered by the Absolute. In its self-deployment within history, the Absolute 
reveals its different facets on various stages of human history setting the 
achievement of freedom as the final goal of mankind. Nourished by the ideas of J. 
G. Herder and J. W. Goete, the Hegelian thought emphasizes the gradual 
realization of freedom in the life of different peoples in non-similar cultural milieu, 
but its final victory is predestined by the universal teleology of the absolute 
spiritual foundation of the universe. “The fulfilment of Spirit therefore requires the 
growth of a community which will fully express and embody reason (Taylor 1998: 
95).” Philosophical reason penetrates into the self-reflexive dialectical movement 
of this absolute substance acquiring the universal dimension. 
 Despite the radical criticism of the Hegelian legacy, Marxism in its classical 
form inherited the universalist dialectical style of philosophizing. It pretended to 
find the universal logic of history thus making it a tool of criticism of all forms of 
cultural alienation and political oppression. At the service of the Marxist political 
ideal, philosophical reason is a satellite of the revolutionary praxis. 
 With the coming of crisis of the classical metaphysics of consciousness, 
philosophical universalism became the target of constant attacks on the part of 
post-classical thought gradually moving to the stage of postmetaphysical thinking. 
This turn is inconceivable without the understanding of the overall change in 
culture of the second part of the 19-th-beginning of the 20-th century. It was 
marked by the interest to the unique cultural events and the emergence of 
historicist thought in humanities, the evolution of science from the classical to the 
post-classical paradigm, and the birth of modernist art. By this shift culture 
reminded philosophical reason of the gap exiting between its ideal image and 
reality that constantly demands attentive critical reflection. In order to sustain its 
image of a self-founding activity of reason, philosophy had to transform itself in 
the never-ending critical reflexion of cultural worlds.  
 The uniqueness of cultural worlds comes to the forefront of philosophical 
discussions in the works of Fr. Schlegel and other theorists of the Romanticism. It 
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becomes a real challenge for philosophy when expressed in different areas of 
humanities by Fr. Ast, J. G. Droysen, and L. von Ranke. Following Fr. 
Schleiermacher, W. Dilthey offered a hermeneutical perspective for the 
philosophical reason aspiring to penetrate into the reality of non-similar cultural 
worlds. Understanding them in their individuality as spiritual wholes, he was 
trying to cope with relativism and save the universal dignity of philosophical 
reasoning by postulating the permanent element of any psychologically biased 
interpretation residing in the eternal nature of human beings. On the basis of the 
transcendental methodology, W. Windelband and H. Rickert were trying to find a 
point of reconciliation between natural sciences and humanities in a priori structure 
of consciousness aimed at once at two vectors of the uniquely given and law and 
based on universal values.  This was a way to save philosophical universalism 
confronted with the challenge of historicism. Fr. Nietzsche was far more radical in 
his perspectivist views and genealogical methodology symbolizing a decisive split 
with universalist aspirations of the classical philosophical reason. After the break 
with the universalism, the critical perspective becomes the most vital alternative 
for philosophical reason. 
 In the course of its formation, post-classical philosophy looks for a point of 
reconciliation between the uniqueness of human condition and universalist 
aspirations of philosophical reasoning.  On this way, philosophical reason was 
inevitably moving to the understanding of its ‘impurity’, deep involvement in the 
inter-subjective relations, historical situation, particular cultural milieu, and, 
finally, in the human body experience. It had to respond to challenges of the 20-th-
21-st century history, to information society innovations, to the new wave in post-
classical science and humanities, as well as to the world interpretations offered by 
modernist and post-modernist art. Given the necessity to critically evaluate this 
cultural situation, philosophical reason gradually comes to the reflexive 
understanding of its hermeneutical function. This kind of transformation of 
philosophical reasoning is evident not only in the anthropological doctrines, but 
also in the schools of thought traditionally associated with analytical philosophy 
and philosophy of science. 
 The transition from the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle to post-
positivist doctrines of K. Popper, Th. Kuhn, and P. Feyerabend  introduced a new 
cultural dimension in the analysis of a plurality of  non-similar paradigms of 
scientific ideas. Feyerabend’s criticism of the relations between contemporary 
science and political establishment reveals an affinity of his thought with the ideas 
of neo-Marxism and post-structuralism.  L. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language 
initiated the ‘linguistic turn’ within the analytical current of thought. Culture and 
language games come into the focus of attention of Wittgenstein’s followers 
revealing the priority of semantics and creating a common area of dialogue with 
anthropological philosophy.  
 Analysing consciousness in the key of transcendental phenomenology, E. 
Husserl came to the conclusion that in the final instance it is rooted in the inter-
subjectively shared life-world.  M. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology nourished 
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by his thought gave birth to different versions of hermeneutics from H.-G. 
Gadamer to R. Bubner and P. Ricoeur. Thus, transcendental reflexion steadily 
moves from the analysis of the a priori structure of reason to the uncovering of the 
being-in-the world producing a variety of conflicting strategies of interpretation of 
human reality (Ricoeur 1969: 27-28). In a phenomenological perspective, M. 
Merleau-Ponty also rightly pointed out that philosophy should not ignore the 
human bodily experiences. 
 The school of Frankfurt Neo-Marxism made a significant contribution to the 
understanding of philosophy as a critical theory. Rejecting the dogmatic doctrine 
of the classical historical materialism, M. Horkheimer, Th. Adorno, H. Marcuse, 
and E. Fromm developed a version of praxis philosophy that produced a prolific 
synthesis of the ideas of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and Weber. The first left-
wing generation of the school of Frankfurt successfully proved that philosophy 
could be interpreted as a self-founding thinking only in the never-ending 
genealogical criticism of cultural tradition in the light of the totality of praxis. The 
philosophical universalism is conceivable only in its concrete historical form as the 
outcome of praxis conditioned critical activity of reason. This attitude to the 
problem was inherited by the next generation of the school of Frankfurt after its 
liberal turn associated with the assumption that “social criticism stands side by side 
with the demands of a historically evolved reason (Honneh 2004: 338).” 
 Irrespective of their differences, French post-structuralism was strongly 
influenced by the neo-Marxist critical theory. Phenomenology and hermeneutics 
also have a significant role in the formation of J. Derrida, M. Foucault, G. Deleuze 
and other leading theorists of post-structuralism. They were convinced that 
philosophy should produce a new kind of iniversalist thought in the critical 
genealogical deconstruction of existing cultural traditions and negotiations with 
them. 
 Contemporary postmetaphysical thinking is the outcome of the development 
of the post-classical Western philosophy facing the necessity to reconsider the task 
and limits of philosophising in view of a new cultural reality. H. Arendt rightly 
remarked in The Life of the Mind that our understanding of the priority of reason 
over the operations of the intellect aimed at the empirically given should be 
accompanied with the new vision of its hermeneutical involvement in the language 
milieu. Reconsidering Kant’s legacy, she comes to the justified conclusion that 
“the intellect (Verstand) desires to grasp what is given to the senses, but reason 
(Vernunft) wishes to understand its meaning (Arendt 1978: 57).” Thus, 
philosophical reason loosing its ‘purity’ and evaluating its deep connections with 
the particular individual and cultural situation unavoidably becomes hermeneutical. 
In order to produce a universally acceptable view, it should get engaged in the 
critical negotiations with the existing cultural traditions. The opportunity to get 
into this dialogue is one of the major issues under the discussion in contemporary 
postmetaphysical thought.     
 New Philosophical Critical Universalism 
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 Under the influence of different cultural traditions, contemporary philosophy 
should inevitably be attentive to their meaningful content and get into critical 
negotiations with them. At the same time, philosophy of the postmetaphysical age 
should work out a new formula of universalism. Otherwise, there is a danger that 
philosophy, betraying its proper mission, will be no longer able to survive after the 
collapse of classical metaphysics. It may degenerate, as Kant predicted, in a kind 
of narrative practice describing and interpreting non-similar cultural traditions. In 
order to remain true to its cosmopolitan vocation, philosophy must be altogether 
critical and universalist. The hermeneutical reason should critically examine the 
content of cultural traditions and find the universal philosophical strategies that are 
adequate to the mosaic panorama of contemporary rapidly shrinking world. 
However, among the leading theorists of postmetaphysical thought there is a 
considerable disagreement regarding the opportunity to preserve philosophical 
universalism in a critical fashion. 
 Perhaps, the most radical denial of an opportunity of survival of any form of 
philosophical universalism was expressed by R. Rorty who openly voiced his 
opposition to the Platonic-Aristotelian ontological constructions of reality, as well 
as to the Cartesian-Kantian philosophy of consciousness within the format of his 
neo-pragmatist doctrine. He looks at Nietzsche as a philosopher who helped to ruin 
the fortress of universalism of the classical metaphysics and paved the way to the 
post-modern stance of thinking. “Post-Nietzschean philosophers like Wittgenstein 
and Heidegger write philosophy in order to exhibit the universality and necessity 
of the individual and the contingent. Both philosophers became caught up in the 
quarrel between philosophy and poetry which Plato began, and both ended by 
trying to work out honorable terms on which philosophy might surrender to poetry 
(Rorty 1989: 26).” Rorty’s own attack on the universalist metaphysics of the past 
was nourished not only by Wittgenstein and Heidegger, but also by J.-P. Sartre, H.-
G. Gadamer, M. Foucault, J. Derrida and other representatives of European 
thought, as well as by such American thinkers as W. James, J. Dewey, Th. Kuhn, 
W. Quine, H. Putnam, and D. Davidson.  
Looking for honorable terms of philosophy’s surrender to poetry, Rorty’s is 
convinced that language is the only reality we could know in its uniqueness and 
contingency. Despite Wittgenstein’s understanding of the rules of language games 
as methods of translation of experience and reality representation, Rorty believes 
that this problem is of no philosophical significance after the world was de-
divinized and viewed as existing in sign systems. He also disregards the fact that 
Wittgenstein was quite critical of extreme nominalism mistakenly “interpreting all 
words as names” and spoke of the rules of language games as preserving certain 
general aspects and playing important role in the concrete communication space 
(Wittgenstein 1964: 118).  
Rorty’s criticism of philosophical universalism rests on his appeal to radical 
nominalism and historicism. His liberal ironist strategy of philosophical reflection 
is rooted in the tradition of the Romanticism and stands in opposition to the 
Enlightenment rationalism. The uniqueness of language vocabularies specific for 
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particular cultures makes their boundaries non-transparent. Thus, language 
contingency and particularity of each historical situation becomes an argument 
against philosophical universalism. This kind of approach resolutely outlaws 
creation of meta-language discourses despite the reality of their natural 
multiplication in the cultural context. Rorty is right claiming that a perfect meta-
discourse clarifying scientific or non-scientific problems is a utopia, but a meta-
discourse practice is a legitimate and inerasable part of culture. 
The liberal ironist rejection of a meta-discourse practice should be regarded 
as a step forward to the refutation of rationality as belonging to the classical stance 
of philosophical thought. “The ironist, by contrast, is a nominalist and a historicist. 
She thinks nothing has an intrinsic nature, a real essence. So she thinks that the 
occurrence of a term like “just” or “scientific” or “rational” in the final vocabulary 
of the day is  no reason to think that Socratic inquiry into the essence of justice or 
science or rationality will take one much beyond the language games of one’s time 
(Rorty 1989: 74-75).” In his criticism of rationality, Rorty is trying to justify his 
approach appealing to Wittgensten’s language philosophy whose message sounds 
differently due to his understanding of language game rules as certain rational 
patterns. Wittgenstein  also believed  that primitive language games could facilitate 
the emergence of their complicated forms thus supporting in fact the idea of the 
historical development of rationality forms (Wittgenstein 1960: 17). Philosophy, in 
his opinion, should clarify the rules of language games, revealing concrete life 
forms existing in human culture. Thus, Wittgenstein interpreted philosophy as a 
critical thinking uncovering the roots of the rational foundations of linguistic 
practice constituting culture. D. Davidson’s works that equally inspired Rorty are 
also based on the idea of inner rationality of different forms of human thought and 
action (Davidson 2005: 319). Rorty’s conclusion that rationality is always a fruit of 
a definite cultural milieu should not be taken for a sound reason to reject its idea as 
philosophically meaningful. If philosophy is deprived of the right to build a 
generalized rational interpretation of cultural forms, it should move in the direction 
similar to literary criticism chosen by Rorty. 
Rorty’s radical break with philosophical universalism conditions his refusal 
to coin a definite formula of liberalism. Declaring the primacy of the private over 
the public, he totally disagrees with J. Habermas and claims the uniqueness of 
Western liberalism as a fruit of particular cultural conditions. Helpless to offer a 
radical political strategy of improvement, a Western liberal ironist is only able to 
feel personal compassion for human beings sufferings in other parts of the world. 
Philosophy’s right to exit after the demise of the classical metaphysics 
should be proved on the basis of the need to obtain a new formula of its critical 
universalism relevant to the contemporary world problems. Dealing with this 
problem, A. Badiou proposed his version of mathematical ontology that should be 
translated in the logics of different worlds. J. Habermas and J. Derrida offered the 
two most popular versions of  philosophy’s self-defence in a critical dialogue with 
culture. While Habermas believes that universalist philosophical views are 
obtainable in a critical communication of rational subjects and then applied to the 
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non-similar life-worlds, Derrida looks at them as the outcome of negotiations with 
different cultures. Both scenarios of philosophy’s self-defence are applicable in the 
currently existing situation. 
 Badiou’s project of a radically new philosophical ontology is based on the 
assumption that it should overcome cultural relativism and find a rationally 
convincing universal order of being that might be compatible simultaneously with 
the coming of a radically new and unpredictable event. Therefore, universality and 
openness for renewal constitute two basic and mutually complementary features of 
his philosophical thought. Badiou is in agreement with M. Heidegger that 
“philosophy as such can only be re-assigned on the basis of the ontological 
question” (Badiou 2010: 2). At the same time, he is persuaded that the analytical 
tradition rightly emphasized the value of the mathematical-logical G. Frege-G. 
Cantor revolution opening new horizons for ontology. Finally, this kind of 
philosophical ontology is inconceivable without the post-Cartesian theory of the 
Subject understood in the key of philosophical synthesis of the ideas K. Marx, S. 
Freud, E. Husserl, J.-P. Sartre, and J. Lacan as ‘void, cleaved, a-substantial, and ir-
reflexive’. Thus, the contemporary conditions for philosophy include for Badiou 
the history of Western thought, post-Cantorian mathemaics, psychoanalysis, 
contemporary art and politics. 
 This kind of approach to philosophy’s task in contemporary world should be 
considered as a response to ‘democratic materialism’ based on the belief that there 
are only bodies and languages. Such strategy of philosophizing is synonymous for 
him with the postmodernist one: “’Postmodern’ is one of the possible names for 
contemporary democratic materialism” (Badiou 2009 : 2).  Getting into the open 
debate with M. Foucault, J. Derrida, G. Deleuze and other representatives of 
postmodern thought, Badiou names his own philosophical platform ‘materialist 
dialectic’. In his interpretation, it differs greatly from the so called democratic 
materialism assuming that “there are only bodies and languages, except that there 
are truths” (Badiou 2009 : 4). Possessing no substantial existence, truths appear in 
the world and compose an ‘atemporal meta-history’.  Badiou repeatedly claims that 
this kind of ‘Platonic gesture’ is demanded to overcome ‘democratic sophistry’ 
putting obstacles on the way of our understanding of a subject’s participation in a 
truth-process. The proclaimed struggle for truth has an evident revolutionary 
colouring and looks as the only ground for finding the affinity of Badiou’s 
materialist dialectic with the orthodox Marxism (Badiou 2009 : 503). It demands a 
revival of a considerably remodelled kind of Platonism able to survive in the 
contemporary mosaic of non-similar cultural worlds.   
 In Being and Event, Badiou worked at the level of pure being determining 
the ontological types of truths and abstract forms of subjects activating them, while 
in Logics of Worlds he approached this area at the level of being-there, in the 
perspective of appearing in different worlds. Comparing his own philosophical 
development to that of Hegel, Badiou believes that Logics of Worlds stands to 
Being and Event as Phenomenology of the Spirit stands to Science of Logic 
(Badiou 2009 : 8). This means that, unlike Hegel, he had to work out first the 
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general ontological foundations of his doctrine, and, then, to prove them at the 
level of a specific version of phenomenology in accord with the prevailing pluralist 
atmosphere our time. His pluralism appears as the other side of the anti-holist 
approach to the basic questions of ontology.  
 The basic assumption of Badiou’s ontology is that being should be 
understood as presentable in a situation where the multiple is given as multiple 
‘substracted’ from the one. “Ontology, insofar as it exists, must necessarily be the 
science of the multiple qua multiple” (Badiou 2010 : 28). Therefore, ontology is 
feasible for Badiou only on the basis of mathematical set theory. His mathematical 
ontology is deeply rooted in the ideas of Plato and Cantor despite the fact that he 
resolutely rules out the existence of the One, unifying all possible multiplicities. E. 
Zermelo- A. Fraenkel theoretical views are the immediate source of inspiration of 
Badiou’s approach to the multiplicity problem. The multiple, in his opinion, is 
composed solely of multiplicities, but the One does not exist. What exists, Badiou 
argues, is the count-as-one - a system of conditions giving a chance to recognize 
the multiple as multiple. 
 Understanding multiplicity as based on the logic of belonging, Badiou 
emphasizes that nothing is the pure multiple upon which the count operates. Due to 
the fact that any multiple is composed of multiples one should logically come to 
the problem of the first count pointing inconceivable without the void which is for 
Badiou “the proper name of being” (Badiou 2010 : 56). This ontological premise 
means that the void is presentable as a constitutive element of any structured 
multiplicity. It signifies the ‘unicity of the unpresentable’ marked within the 
presentation and forms an origin of any structure or meta-structure. The void in 
this perspective paves the way for the methodologically conceivable operation of 
presentation of an initial finite multiple and the open infinity without the One 
(Badiou 2010 : 148). The existence of the infinite Other is not identical for Badiou 
with the One due to his resolute atheism and refutation of God’s existence (Badiou 
2010 : 277). Giving reasons for the inexistence of the One, he appeals to B. 
Russell’s paradox without any further reference to the solution offered by type 
theory and its horizons. On the assumed platform of the ‘abnormality’ of a set of 
all sets, Badiou declares the inexistence of Nature and History that looks quite 
problematic in the key of type theory (Badiou 2010 : 140; 176). Within the infinite 
counting-as-one process, the relations between oneness and infinity also demand 
further elucidation. The One together with the infinite Other persistently remind of 
themselves in any thought effort. 
 The inexistence of History does not mean in Badiou’s ontology the denial of 
historicity whose origin is the local evental site appearing in a situation. The event 
is characterized as “a one-multiple made up of, on the one hand, all the multiples 
which belong to its site, and on the other hand, the event itself” (Badiou 2010 : 
179). From the ontological point of view, the evental site is thus interpreted as ‘an 
abnormal multiple on the edge of the void’ which is retroactively qualified as such 
by the event’s occurrence. Due to the fact that the event belongs to a given 
structured situation without being included, it is always producing historical 
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singularity ‘on-the-edge-of-the-void’. The event, in Badiou’s set theory 
description, does not belong to being qua being, but it intervenes into the situation 
through nomination generating a structured sequence. Like J. Böhme’s ‘Ungrund’, 
the void interpreted by Badiou as ‘the name of the Other’ is at the origin of the 
event’s historicity. 
 Within the format of Badiou’s philosophy, truth comes together with the 
event as ‘indiscernible’, revealed by the post-evental fidelity operation under the 
circumstances of a given situation and contrasts the existing state of knowledge. 
He proposes a strong demarcation line between veridicity of a statement within a 
certain ‘encyclopaedia of knowledge’ with its conventional rules and truth which 
always ‘makes a hole’ in it (Badiou 2009 : 2).  Truth is also characterized as the 
‘infinite element’ of a situation containing infinity of inquiries. Badiou is a strong 
opponent of any form of a constructivist approach which “naturally prevails in 
established situations because it measures being to language such as it is” (Badiou 
2010 : 328). However, it is easily noticeable that his criticism of I. Kant and any 
form of contemporary constructivist epistemology contradicts the basic 
assumptions of his approach to ontology making on the platform of a mathematical 
set theory. It is nothing other than a form of mathematical transcendentalism with 
conventionally established inter-subjectively valid rules. When Badiou discusses 
the problem of a truth nomination, it becomes apparent that this process is 
inconceivable without the mixture of already existing and newly introduced 
language conventions, coexistence of the old and new descriptive vocabularies. 
The purely mathematical proof of a possibility of a name’s neutrality is not able to 
refute the semantic practice reality with its circular reference structure which is 
deeply imbedded in ordinary language. 
 Breaking with the traditional understanding of the subject, Badiou offers its 
interpretation as a “local configuration of generic procedure” that supports truth 
(Badiou 2010 : 391).  Subject, he argues, is not substantial in its nature and is 
represented in individual (the domain of love), mixed (the realm of science and 
art), and collective (the sphere of politics) forms. Subjectivation process counts 
what is ‘faithfully connected’ with the event and introduces new nomination in a 
definite area in order to express truth. “A subject is a local evaluator of self-
mentioning statements: he or she knows-with regard to the situation to-come, thus 
from the standpoint of the indiscernible – that these statements are either certainly 
wrong, or possibly veridical but suspended from the will-have-taken-place of one 
positive enquiry” (Badiou 2010 : 404). Creating a discourse in a finite local 
situation a subject faces the infinity of truth. Here again the author is confronted 
with the dilemma of expressing the infinity within the newly born discourse system 
which should be inevitably transformed into the ‘encyclopaedia of knowledge’.     
 A. Badiou’s book gives a chance to understand the main facets of the 
problem of the relations of being and event in the light of contemporary scientific 
and cultural experience. The freshness of its main ideas creates a real intellectual 
challenge and evidently contributes to the formation of the new reflexive pattern of 
philosophizing emerging in the 21-st century.   
12 
 
 Truths, making human beings immortal, are articulated in Badiou’s 
metaphysics in the spheres of science, art, politics, and love by faithful, obscure, 
and reactive subjects.  Each of these subjects is specifically related to the present 
and understood as “a register of experience, a schema for the conscious distribution 
of the reflexive and non-reflexive” (Badiou 2009 : 47). The general theory of 
appearing or being-there is the area of study of a Greater Logic that differs from 
the ordinary logic which is a grammar of correct statements accompanied by a 
theory of deduction and a semantics of interpretations (Badiou 2009 : 93). Badiou 
believes that the main task of his Greater logic is to think ‘worldly’ multiple, 
objects and their relations in appearing or localization.    
 Badiou’s Greater Logic is based on the assumption of the inexistence of the 
Whole which is the cornerstone of his ontological views. He comes to this 
conclusion on the basis of the famous B. Russell’s paradox ruling out logically the 
possibility that a set can contain itself or belong to itself. The set of all sets – the 
Whole or the Universe – becomes for Badiou the inconceivable Chimera (Badiou 
2009 : 110). He continues the attack on the Western ontological thought that was 
launched in the French philosophy by E. Levinas with a different set of arguments. 
Within the format of Badiou’s doctrine based on the mathematical ontology, 
Infinity non-related to localized sets of multiples becomes unthinkable. He comes 
to the conclusion that “the identified multiple is a ‘being of the world’” (Badiou 
2009 : 113). Any singular being is identified in the world through its relations with 
other beings in a certain situation. In contrast to Hegel’s logical universalism, the 
Greater Logic uncovers within the non-similar worlds their logical order 
represented each time in its specific form (Badiou 2009 : 143). It is based on the 
assumption that there is no logic but the logics of different classical and non-
classical worlds. 
 Each individual world is ordered in Badiou’s version of ‘objective 
phenomenology’ by its own transcendental. It designates that a world, where pure 
multiplicities appear as objects, possesses a basic order-structure conditioning the 
network of identities and differences of its constitutive elements. Despite of 
Badiou’s doctrine evident rootedness in the tradition of transcendental philosophy, 
he expresses disagreement with I. Kant and E. Husserl who, in his opinion, 
overlook that the transcendental logical order depends on the ontology of the 
situations of being (Badiou 2009 : 173-174). However, it is hardly deniable that 
these situations of being are imaginable only within the transcendental operations 
of consciousness. 
 Although the French philosopher stands in opposition to postmodernism, he 
introduces the set of categories portraying the constitution of the worlds and the 
process of change within them that sound in accord with the post-classical stance 
of philosophizing. Any world is portrayed in its static form in Badiou’s 
phenomenology as composed of objects – “units of appearing in the world” 
identified within the framework of transcendental indexing with their phenomenal 
properties and ultimately atoms – and their relations. “A world is ontologically 
assignable by that which appears, and logically assignable by the relations between 
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the apparents” (Badiou 2009 : 305). Identity and difference, existence and non-
existence of the objects are defined through their worldliness. At the same time, 
variable worlds are subjected to change and characterized in Badiou’s book by the 
categories of site, weak and strong singularity, and, finally, event.  A site is defined 
by the author as “a reflexive multiplicity, which belongs to itself and thereby 
transgresses the laws of being” (Badiou 2009 : 369). Bridging the gap between 
being and being-there, a site appears to disappear and instantaneously reveals the 
void out of which the strong singularity of an event comes to the world. Declaring 
his disagreement with Deleuze, Badiou removes an event from the ‘ascendancy of 
the One’ and ‘delivers it to the stars’ as revealing truth. 
 The subjective truth-procedure and the objective appearance of the 
multiplicities in a world are understood as mutually complementing each other in 
Badiou’s theory of points. Any point ‘dualizes the infinite’ in an instant of decision 
making a truth appear in a place of a world (Badiou 2009 : 409). It is associated 
with the production of the subjective formalism through the application of different 
thought operations to collecting the traces of the vanished events in the light of 
their possible modes of relations with the present. A multiple-being that bears this 
subjective formalism and makes it appear in a world is interpreted by the author as 
a non-organic body representing “the totality of the elements of the site 
incorporated into the evental present” (Badiou 2009 : 468). Thus, the past should 
always meet the present signalling ‘the true life’ which is for Badiou the instant of 
creation and eternal truth coming. In contrast to Stalinist version of Marxism 
inherited by L. Althusser, this move should disjoin his version of materialist 
dialectic, the philosophy ‘of emancipation through truths’ from historical 
materialism, to break with the ‘cult of genealogies and narratives’ (Badiou 2009 : 
509). It should also draw a demarcation line between his doctrine and postmodern 
thought. 
 Responding to the problems raised in postmodern French thought, Alain 
Badiou offers an original rational scenario of interpreting them in a new key. It is 
aimed at developing a universalist strategy of philosophizing adequate to the 
mosaic multiplicity of non-similar cultural worlds. At the same time, his theoretical 
thought is unable to completely bridge the gap between mathematical ontology and 
their variety. 
 Unlike Rorty, Habermas is a strong opponent of philosophical post-
modernism and a theorist who believes in the power of communicative rationality 
as a basis of a new critical universalist stance of philosophizing. In his version of 
neo-Marxist philosophy, he gave a profound analysis of the crisis of the classical 
metaphysics and came to the conclusion that in order to survive, philosophy should 
learn the lessons of the Enlightenment and reinterpret them coining a new pattern 
of a critical universalism. It should be able to apply its universal descriptive and 
normative content to particular cultural milieu. In this respect contemporary critical 
universalism differs, in his opinion, from the highly valued Kantian and Hegelian 
heritage subjected to just and severe criticism by the representatives of language 
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philosophy, structuralism, post-structuralism, neo-Marxism and neo-pragmatism 
(Habermas 1994: 37-38).  
Habermas resolutely disagrees not only with Rorty’s refutation of 
philosophical universalism, but also with Wittgenstein’s interpretation of the 
merely “therapeutic” vocation of philosophy. This therapeutic understanding of 
philosophy, he argues, means a “farewell to philosophy” non-critically leaving the 
world as it is. Philosophy in its “therapeutic” function is unable by its very 
definition to change the world. “Field research in cultural anthropology seems to 
be the strongest candidate to succeed philosophy after its demise. Surely the 
history of philosophy will henceforth be interpreted as the unintelligible doings of 
some outlandish tribe that today is fortunately extinct (Habermas 1995: 11).” In 
order to avoid this tragic final, Habermas offers his own strategy of philosophical 
critical universalism needed in a radically changing world.  
Philosophy, in Habermas opinion, should respond to the challenges of 
contemporary culture that since the beginning of the European Modernity suffers a 
divorce between its main branches – science, morality, and art. “Since the dawn of 
modernity in the eighteenth century, cultures has generated those structures of 
rationality that Max Weber and Emil Lask conceptualized as cultural value 
spheres. Their existence calls for description and analysis, not philosophical 
justification. Reason has split into three moments – modern science, positive law 
and post-traditional ethics, and autonomous art and institutionalized art criticism – 
but philosophy had precious little to do with this disjunction (Habermas 1995: 
17).” Habermas argues that philosophy today should play a role of a witness and 
mediator trying to reconcile various branches of diversified human knowledge and 
alienated areas of culture. Transforming itself on the communicative basis, it 
proves that rationality and universality should prevail in the sphere of knowledge, 
as well as in the coinage of norms governing the relations of society. Kant’s 
categorical imperative should be regarded as a corner stone of normative 
justification and selection (Habermas 1995: 58).  
In response to Rorty’s criticism, Habermas argues that universality and 
rationality as fruits of theoretical and practical reason are born independently of the 
context of particular lifeworlds. However, only a particular lifeworld should 
translate, for instance, the universal insights of morality into concrete actions and 
prove their validity. “Within the horizon of the lifeworld, practical judgements 
derive both their concreteness and their power to motivate action from their inner 
connection to unquestionably accepted ideas of the good life, in short, in their 
connection to ethical life and its institutions (Habermas 1995: 108-109).” Thus, 
universal rationally grounded morality becomes applicable only in the context of 
particular lifeworlds with their concrete set of ethical values. Habermas creates a 
point of reconciliation between opposed Kant’s and Hegel’s approaches to this 
problem preparing the ground for his liberal-republicanism unifying public and 
private spheres. Philosophical universalism, according to this strategy, should find 
a critical application to a variety of cultural forms, particular lifeworlds thus 
proving its validity. 
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Derrida’s post-sructuralist defense of philosophical universalism is a direct 
response to the Kantian approach to this problem under the post-modern condition. 
Irrespective of evident discord with Kant’s version of transcendental idealism, 
Derrida confessed that his deconstruction doctrine is deeply rooted in the idea of 
power of critical philosophical reflexion that was born within the European 
Enlightenment milieu and most clearly articulated by Kant (Derrida 2007: 44-45). 
New philosophical universalism, according to Derrida, may emerge as a result of 
critical deconstructive negotiations with historical tradition. In this respect, neither 
Kantian teleology of history, nor his rigid Eurocentrism is acceptable for Derrida 
as a foundation for his own critical universalism. Reacting to the often heard 
accusations that the deconstruction strategy is not sensitive to the pulse of history, 
Derrida responds that he was always interested in “certain historicity” in its 
transcendental version offered by E. Husserl or M. Heidegger (Derrida 2002: 157). 
To stand in opposition to the metaphysical constructions of history does not mean 
for him to deny its reality. A truly universalist philosophy, in Derrida’s opinion, 
should reject the metaphysical teleology of history and get into the negotiations 
with different cultural traditions aspiring to learn from them.  
 If history is not teleologically determined and open to the unpredictable 
future, deconstruction becomes equal to a permanent negotiation process with 
tradition unbreakably related to positive affirmation preserving certain effects of 
the past (Derrida 2002: 16). Negotiation procedure is dependent on a certain 
context giving its impulse for the deconstruction: “An essential aspect of 
negotiation is that it is always different, differential, not only from one individual 
to another, from one situation to another, but even for the same individual, from 
one moment to the next.  There are only contexts, and this is why deconstructive 
negotiation cannot produce general rules, “methods” (Derrida 2002: 17). Highly 
evaluating J. Austin’s and P. de Man’s views, Derrida looks at cultural traditions as 
discourse producing machines, pattern strategies of coining texts that are strongly 
motivated by power drives enrooted in the language. He believes that the new 
cosmopolitan understanding of philosophy’s mission should contain a 
reformulation of the Kantian reading of universalism due to the existence of 
different cultures and worldviews. Interpreting philosophical universalism as the 
outcome of the negotiations process with non-similar cultural and thought 
traditions, he gives a new formula of the basic foundations of the deconstruction 
platform. 
As a permanent deconstructive and affirmative practice, philosophy is 
understood by Derrida as self-founding activity. Thus, by its very definition 
philosophy appears as an activity which is universalistic in its aspiration.  Derrida 
looks at philosophy as an endless search for the rational legitimation, its “absolute 
source”: “Philosophy stands under the law that demands that the right to 
philosophy never end, and that it never suspend questioning, irony, skepsis, 
epochē, or doubt when facing any phiosopheme, even the philosopheme that seems 
to be found in a determinate fashion a given declaration of rights, for example the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, including the right to philosophy” (Derrida 
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2002a: 40).  Declaring that philosophy should constantly remodel the forms of its 
self-representation, Derrida refers to the tradition of Kantian transcendental 
reflection as a source of his own approach to this problem. He speaks of a duality 
of the relations between philosophy and culture:  any true philosopher raised in a 
particular cultural milieu should go beyond it surpassing its limits in search of a 
new horizon of the world understanding (Derrida 2002a: 38).  
Summing up his vision of the contemporary cosmopolitan-universalist 
approach to philosophy, Derrida formulated a set of general conditions of its 
development. As a first one of them he declares the existence of plurality of 
philosophical and cultural traditions: “Whoever thinks that the right to philosophy 
from a cosmopolitan point of view must be respected, granted, extended will have 
to take into account the competition that exists and has always existed between 
several models, styles, philosophical traditions, linked to national or linguistic 
histories, even if they can never be reduced to effects of nationhood of language 
(Derrida 2002: 337).” In this respect, the confrontation between the continental and 
analytic or Anglo-Saxon philosophy is for Derrida the most canonical example. He 
calls for a critical displacement and deconstruction of their ‘hegemonies’ through 
the access to places and events that are beyond the limits of their opposition. The 
expected effect of this move, he believes, should be intra-European and bring 
fruitful results. Derrida’s philosophical heritage may be regarded as an important 
step in this direction. 
The second condition for the expansion of contemporary cosmopolitan 
approach to philosophizing demands “the appropriation but also the overflowing of 
what are said to be…the founding or originary languages of philosophy – the 
Greek, Latin, Germanic, or Arabic languages (Derrida 2002: 338).” Derrida’s 
fidelity to the roots of philosophy, its founding languages goes hand in hand with 
his persuasion that any language can become a leader in expressing the 
cosmopolitan voice of philosophy today. The English language playing a very 
important role in this respect, in his opinion, should become today a vehicle for the 
universal philosophical reflexion and communication on the condition that its 
practice is freed of the phenomena of dogmatism and authority it may produce.  
Likewise, cosmopolitan-universalist philosophy is unimaginable for Derrida 
as a servant of a particular form of culture assuming a leading role. Globalization is 
the outcome of universalizing all kind of human relations within the world 
community on the basis of expansion of science and technology (Derrida 2002b: 
226-227). Derrida is positive in his attitude to the universalizing role of science 
and technology. However, he is radically opposed to scientism and glorification of 
technological development (Derrida 2002: 339). Inheriting the Enlightenment 
outlook on the importance of scientific knowledge, he goes further and argues that 
critical thought should subject to doubt any particular fruit of reason, any cultural 
form. He rightly believes that negotiating with different forms of culture, a truly 
cosmopolitan philosophy should preserve its independent status. 
This understanding of philosophical thinking paves the way for Derrida’s 
political ideal of democracy to come which is not an idea in the Kantian sense, but 
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a universal perspective to be reached in the struggle for authentic human relations. 
He finds a Kantian idea at once too definite and unable to express the openness of 
the future. For this reason the democracy to come should be understood as a 
perspective that is always on the way of its new conceptual expression. His strong 
belief is that it is impossible to dissociate the right to philosophy “from a 
cosmopolitan point of view” from this political perspective. The ideal of 
democracy to come is, of course, deeply rooted in Greek democratic practice, but 
is irreducible to any historically existing phenomena. Philosophy is able, in 
Derrida’s opinion, to contribute to the coinage of new images of democracy in 
accord with the changing social, cultural and political circumstances.      
The authentic relation to the other is at the root of Derrida’s vision of 
democracy to come. He calls this relation messianic, able to arrive at any moment 
and having no horizon. Derrida’s doctrine of messianic relation as opposed to any 
kind of messiahnism is a secularized version of its interpretation offered by 
Levinas. It emphasizes the role of the intellectuals as bearers of the messianic force 
in the permanent creation of democracy to come. 
As the third condition needed for the development and expansion of the 
contemporary cosmopolitan-universalist stance of philosophizing Derrida declares 
the necessity of permanent struggle with the governmental attempts to limit its 
influence in the educational system. Here again he stresses the significance of 
Kant’s approach to the question of autonomy of philosophy in the university 
system (Derrida 2002: 340). In a number of his works, Derrida claims that today 
under the totally different conditions philosophy is still endangered in its free 
existence not only in the totalitarian and authoritarian states, but also in Western 
democratic countries. Therefore, philosophy in a cosmopolitan sense should be 
engaged today in the never-ending theoretical and practical struggle for its right to 
exist as a self-founding thought activity. 
In the rapidly globalizing world, cotemporary philosophy should work out a 
strategy combining universalism and critical approach to a mosaic of its cultural 
reality. After the demise of classical metaphysics, philosophy is no longer able to 
address culture with its ideal image portraying the teleological path of its 
perfection. However, despite its new roles of mediator and witness bridging gaps 
between different cultural forms, philosophy should not loose its capacity of a self-
founding thinking. Otherwise, it may degenerate into a kind criticism aimed at the 
unique phenomena and producing no general meanings nourishing cultures. The 
hermeneutical reason is moving to a new kind of critical universalism getting into 
prolific negotiations with a variety of cultures, learning from them and producing 
general meaningful interpretations of human world problems that are directed 
against any form of power abuse and violence existing in society. As a rational 
self-founding and interpretative critical thinking, philosophy unmasks the 
machinery of alienation and evil production under its different guises thus proving 
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founding thinking. Otherwise, it may degenerate into a kind criticism aimed at the 
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prolific negotiations with a variety of cultures, learning from them and producing 
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